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GEORGE HUNTINGTON HARTFORD II, Petitioner, T. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUN-
TY, Respondent; EDWARD BARTON COLT, a Minor, 
etc., Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Process-Defects and Remedies-Motion to Quash-Mandamus. 
-The purpose of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 416.1, 416.3, is to permit a 
defendant to challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his 
person by motion to quash or writ of mandate without waiving 
his right to defend on the merits by permitting a default to be 
entered against him while the jurisdictional issue is being 
determined, and to achieve such purpose, when relief has been 
denied in the trial court, it is necessary that relief be sought 
in the appellate court before the time to plead has expired, 
since otherwise defendant would be compelled to elect between 
permitting the entry of a default or waiving the jurisdictional 
issue by pleading to the merits. 
[2] ld.-Defects and Remedies-Motion to Quash-Mandamus.-
When Code Civ. Proc., §§ 416.1,416.3, setting forth the proce-
dure of attacking jurisdiction of the person of defendant by 
motion to quash or writ of mandate, are construed together, 
they provide alternative methods of securing an additional 
20-day period to petition for a writ of mandate, and failure to 
secure an extension under § 416.3 does not preclude issuance 
of the writ if the petition is filed within the time permitted 
to plead under § 416.1. 
[8] ld.-Service by Publication-Construction of Statute.-As 
used in Code Civ. Proe., § 417, declaring that where jurisdiction 
is acquired over a person who is outside this state by publica. 
ation of summons in accordance with §§ 412, 413, the ClOurt 
shall have power to render a personal judgment against such 
person only if he was personally served with a Clopy of the 
summons and was a "resident" of this state at the time of 
commencement of the action or at the time of service, the word 
"resident" means "domiciliary," so that where defendant was 
Dot at any relevant time a domiciliary of this state, § 417 
precludes personal judgment against him. , 
[1] See Ca1.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, § 72. 
[8] See Ca1.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, § 27 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Process, § 90 et seq. 
Jl[cK:. Dig. References: [1,2] Process, §72; [8] Process, 528; 
: [(.12] IDegitimacy, § 17.5-
I 
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[4] IDegitimacy-Declaration of Parental Relation.-A proceeding 
under Civ. Code, § 231, to secure a declaration that defendant 
is plaintiff's father, is not necessarily classified as one in rem, 
particularly if such classification would result in making the 
judgmen~ binding as to the status of the parties in subsequent 
litigation between them or others; the purpose of the particu-
lar action brought under such section must be considered to 
determine how it should be characterized. 
[5] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-Under Civ. Code, § 231. 
providing for declarations of existence or nonexistence of the 
relation of parent and child by birth or adoption, the state 
may adjudicate the nonexistence of the parent-child relation-
ship between its domiciliary and a person not subject to its 
jurisdiction if adequate notice is provided, but the severing 
of a relationship or an adjudication that it never existed for 
the purpose of establishing the parties' freedom from it in the 
future is not the same thing as creating it or establishing its 
present existence; the basic difference is between the state's 
power to insulate its domiciliary from a relationship with one 
not within its jurisdiction and its lack of power to reach out 
aild fasten a relationship on a person over whom it has DO 
jurisdiction. 
[6] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-If the purpose of an 
action under Civ. Code, § 231, to secure a declaration that 
defendant is plaintiff's father were to enforce r. duty of support 
or some other personal obligation growing out of the parent-
child relationship, personal jurisdiction over defendant would 
be essential. 
[7] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-The requirement of 
personal jurisdiction over defendant, in an action brought 
under Civ. Code, § 231, to secure a declaration that he is plain-
tift's father, cannot be avoided by limiting the relief sought 
to a binding declaration of the parties' status, since such an 
adjudication would prevent relitigation of the basic issue on 
which defendant's personal obligations to plaintiff must rest and 
to that extent would necessarily constitute a personal judg-
ment against him. 
[8] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-The fact that it may 
appear unlikely that plaintiff, suing to secure a declaration 
that defendant is his father, will ever have occasion to assert 
any personal rights against defendant based on the claimed 
relationship between them cannot justify giving any judgment 
that might be obtained an eftect to which it would otherwise 
not be entitled. 
[8] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-Even when it is not 
res judicata, a determination of pedigree may constitute evi-
dence of the facts adjudicated, and such a determination mar 
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be sufficient to satisfy governmental authorities that require 
for one purpose or another satisfactory evidence of birth and 
identity. 
[10] Id.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-The fact that a de-
terminlltion of pedigree might be used in subsequent litigation 
would not constitute a denial of due process. 
[l1] Id.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-Civ. Code, § 231, pro-
viding for declarations of existence or nonexistence of the 
relation of parent and child by birth or adoption, may not 
reasonably be interpreted as authorizing an action to secure a 
judgment the effect of which would necessarily be limited to 
constituting evidence of the facts adjudicated. 
[12] Id.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-In an action under 
Civ. Code, § 231, to secure a declaration that defendant is 
plaintiff's father, the judgment could not be res judicata in 
whole or in part in the absence of personal jurisdiction over 
defendant, and it could not conclusively adjudicate the future 
relationship of the parties to one another. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County to enter an order quashing service of 
summons. Writ granted. 
Loeb & Loeb and Herman F. Selvin for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamo-
reaux, Assistant County Counsel, David Mix and Thomas H. 
Carver, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
Bernard B. Cohen and Henry S. Cohen for Real Party in 
Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 30, 1955, plaintiff, by his 
guardian ad litem, commenced an action pursuant to Civil 
Code, section 231,1 to secure a declaration that defendant is 
his father. In his verified complaint he alleged that he 
is 17 years old and that since he was 10 days old he has 
been in the exclusive care and custody of his grandmother 
with whom he resides. For more than eight years plaintiff 
and his grandmother have been domiciled in Los Angeles 
County, California, "and during all of said time have been 
and now are residents of and physically present in said 
1" An action may be brought for the purpose of having declared the 
existence or nonexistence between the parties of the relation of parent 
and child, by birth or adoption." 
ffl Cold-II 
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County and State." Plaintiff was born in New York in 
1938, the child of his mother and defendant, who were never 
married. His mother died in 1941. To conceal the fact that 
plaintiff was his natural child, defendant directed that the 
names of plaintiff's grandmother and stepgrandfather be 
entered as his parents on his birth certificate, and this was 
done. Defendant has always "exhibited sincere interest in 
and concern for the welfare of plaintiff," and has visited him 
in California when he has been in the state in connection 
with businesses he maintains here. HE: established a trust 
fund of which plaintiff is beneficiary and from which his guard-
ian receives an income of over $800 per month for plaintiff's 
care and maintenance, and ultimately plaintiff will receive 
the corpus of the trust, which is now worth more than 
$375,000. Accordingly, "it is not necessary for defendant 
to payor contribute any money or anything else toward 
plaintiff's support." Shortly before the commencement of 
this action, defendant ., for the first time denied, and he now 
denies that he is the natural father of plaintiff and denies 
that the relationship of parent and child exists between 
them. .. Defendant came to California on July 10. 1955, on 
a business trip but left on August 31, 1955, on learning 
that plaintiff intended to file this action. Plaintiff finally 
alleges that although he "is identified on his birth certificate 
as 'Edward Barton Colt,' for many years last past plaintiff 
bas refrained from using the surname 'Colt' and bas used 
only the name 'Edward Barton.' Plaintiff has obtained a 
Federal Social Security number under the name of 'Edward 
Barton,' and is registered in school and for many years has 
been and now is known among his friends and acquaintances 
as 'Edward Barton.' In the near future, plaintiff expects 
to become a member of the United States Armed Forces, and 
also intends to apply for a passport so that he may travel 
abroad. Considerable confusion has resulted and will result 
from plaintiff's use of the name 'Edward Barton' when he is 
identified on his birth certificate as 'Edward Barton Colt.' 
Moreover, because his birth certifiCate falsely states that 
John Colt is his father, and plaintiff is identified thereon 
as 'Edward Barton Colt,' it is impossible for plaintiff legally 
to establish his true identity or that of his true father. It 
is therefore necessary that it be judicially determined that 
defendant George Huntington Hartford, II, is the natural 
father of plaintiff and that the relation of parent and child 
exists between them, so that hereafter plaintiff will have no 
Dec. 1956] HARTFORD tJ. SUPERIOR COURT 
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difficulty legally establishing the true identity of himself and 
his father, especially when he enters the Armed Forces and 
when he applies for a passport." The complaint concludes 
with the prayer that "the court by its decree adjudge that 
defendant is the natural father of plaintiff, and that the rela-
tion of parent and child exists between plaintiff and de-
fendant .... " 
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 412, plaintiff 
secured an order for service by publication based on an affi-
davit stating that defendant resides outside of the state, and 
defendant was personally served in the State of New York. 
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 413.) The order for service by publi-
cation provided that it was" applicable only to that portion of 
the relief prayed for in the complaint which is based on an 
action • in rem.' " 
On January 6,1956, defendant appeared specially and made 
a motion for an order quashing service. Affidavits were filed 
in support of and in opposition to the motion, which was 
denied on January 11th. The order of denial also provided: 
"Pursuant to stipulation defendant is allowed 30 days to 
answer or otherwise plead to plaintiff's complaint." On 
February 9th, defendant filed this petition for a writ of man-
date to compel the court to enter its order quashing the service 
of summons. 
The procedure for attacking the jurisdiction of the court 
over the person of defendant by motion to quash the writ of 
mandate is now set forth in Code of Civil Procedure, sections 
416.1' and 416.38, which were enacted in 1955. 
• Any defendant or cross-defendant upon whom service of summons 
has been made may serve and 111e, on or before the last day on whieb 
he is required to plead, or within BUch further time as the eourt may 
for good cause allow, a notice of motion to quash the service of summons, 
upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him. . . . In 
the event of the service and filing of such motion, the time of the moving 
party to plead to the complaint or cross-complaint shall be extended, and 
no default may be entered against him, until the expiration of 10 days 
following service upon him of written notice of entry of an order of 
the court denying the motion. Upon good cause being shown, the conrt 
may extend the latter 10-day period for an adiitional period not u-
eeeding 20 days. Neither an application to the court by any defendant 
or cross-defendant for an extension of time within which to plead, nor 
the granting of such extension nor entering into a stipulation of the 
parties for sueb pxtension, shall constitute a general appearance by said 
defendant or cross-defendant." 
"'If a motion of a defendant or cross-defendant to quash service of 
summons, as provided in section 416.1 of this code, is denied by the 
court, he may, before pleading and within 10 days after service upon 
him of written notice of the order of the court denying the motion, or 
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Since in the present case written notice of the court's order 
denying the motion to quash service was served on January 
12th and since defendant's petition for a writ of mandate 
was not filed/until 18 days later and no extension pursuant 
to section 416.3 was obtained, plaintiff contends that the writ 
was filed too late. Defendant contends, however, that he 
sufficiently complied with the statute by filing his petition 
within the 30 days allowed him under section 416.1 to .. answer 
or otherwise plead to plaintiff's complaint." 
[1] The obvious purpose of sections 416.1 and 416.3 is to 
permit a defendant to challenge the jurisdiction of the court 
over his person without waiving his right to defend on the 
merits by permitting a default to be entered against him 
while the jurisdictional issue is being determined. (See 1 
Witkin, California Procedure, 1955 Statutory Supplement, 
17-19.) To achieve this purpose, when relief has been denied 
in the trial court, it is necessary that relief be sought in the 
appellate court before the time to plead has expired. Other-
wise the defendant would be compelled to elect between per-
mitting the entry of a default or waiving the jurisdictional 
issue by pleading to .the merits. [2] If, however, the writ is 
filed in the appellate court within the additional 20-day period 
permitted to plead in the trial court under section 416.1, no 
purpose would be served by requiring the defendant to dupli-
cate the 20·day extension secured under section 416.1 by 
securing a concurrent extension under section 416.3. Ac-
cordingly, when the two sections are construed together, it 
is apparent that they provide alternative methods of securing 
an additional 20-day period to petition for a writ of mandate 
and that a failure to secure an extension under the provisions 
of section 416.3 does not preclude issuance of the writ, if the 
petition is filed within the time permitted to plead under 
section 416.1. 
Defendant contends that the relief sought by plaintiff is 
necessarily a personal judgment against him and that since 
he is not a California domiciliary (see Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
within such additional time not exceeding 20 days as the court may allow, 
petition an appropriate appellate court for a writ of mandate directed 
to the court wherein the action or proceeding is pending requiring the 
entry of its order quashing the service of summons. If he shall there-
upon serve npon the adverse party and file with the clerk of the latter 
court a notice that he has petitioned for such writ of mandate, his time 
to plead shall be extended, and no defnult may be entered against him, 
for a period of 10 days following written notice of the final judgment 
in the mandamus proceeding, which time for good cause may be extended 
by the court for an additional period of not to exceed 20 days." 
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U.S. 457 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357]), it 
would deny him due process of law to sustain the service of 
process made outside the state. It is unnecessary to decide 
whether any constitutional basis other than domicile may exist 
in this case for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendant 
by process served elsewhere. (See Ehrenzweig, Personal 
Jurisdiction, 65 Yale L.J. 289; Ehrenzweig and Mills, Personal 
Service, 41 Cal.L.Rev. 383.) [3] Code of Civil Procedure, 
section 417, provides that "Where jurisdiction is acquired 
over a person who is outside of this State by publication of 
summons in accordance with Sections 412 and 413, the court 
shall have the power to render a personal judgment against 
such person only if he was personally served with a copy 
of the summons and complaint, and was a resident of this 
State at the time of the commencement of the action or at 
the time of service." Since the term resident in this statute 
means domiciliary (Smith v. Smith, 45 Ca1.2d 235, 240 [288 
P.2d 497]), and since it is undisputed that defendant was not 
at any time relevant herein a domiciliary of California, sec-
tion 417 precludes the entry of a personal judgment against 
him. 
[4] Plaintiff contends that since the purpose of the pro-
ceeding is only to establish the status of the parties as parent 
and child, it is a proceeding in rem and that therefore per-
sonal service within the state is not required. He argues that 
the state of his domicile has sufficient interest in his status 
as defendant's child to adjudicate that status without secur-
ing personal jurisdiction over defendant. We do not believe, . 
however, that because the present proceeding is concerned 
solely with status it must necessarily be classified as a pro-
ceeding in rem, particularly if such a classification would 
result in making the judgment binding as to the status of the 
parties in subsequent litigation between them or others. The 
purpose of the particular action brought under Civil Code, 
section 231, must be considered to determine how it should 
be characterized. 
[5] That section provides for declarations of both the 
existence and nonexistence of the relation of parent and child 
by birth or adoption, and a distinction may reasonably be 
drawn between a proceeding to establish that the defendant 
is not the plaintiff's parent and one to establish that he is. 
By analogy to the rule applicable to ex parte divorces, it 
could reasonably be contended that the state may adjudicate 
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the nonexistence of the parent-child relationship between its 
domiciliary and a perSOll not subject to its jurisdiction if 
adequate notice is provided. (See Williams v. North Caro· 
lina, 317 U.s. 287, 303 [63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 
1273] ; Bing Gee v. Chan Lai ¥ung Gee, 89 Cal.App.2d 877. 
884 [202 P.2d 360]; E.~tate of Smith, 86 Cal.App.2d 456, 
465 [195 P.2d 842] ; Estate of Hampton, 55 Ca1.App.2d 543. 
559-562 [131 P.2d 565] ; In re Soderberg, 26 Ariz. 404 [226 
P. 210, 211]; cf., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 [73 
S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221].) The severing of a relationship 
or an adjudication that it never existed for the purpose of 
establishing the parties' freedom from it in the future is not 
the same thing, however, as creating it or establishing its 
present existence. (See Fre.ser, Jurisdi~tion by Necessity. 
100 Univ. of Pa.L.Rev. 305, 312.) Thus it has been recog' 
nized that a decree of divorce is a judgment in rem only 
to the extent it determines that the parties are thereafter 
free to remarry and is in personam to the extent it determines 
that a marriage existed at the time it was entered. (Rediker 
v. Rediker, 35 Ca1.2d 796, 800-801 (221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 
1152].) Basically the difference is between the state's power 
to insulate its domiciliary from a relationship with one not 
within its jurisdiction and its lack of power to reach out 
and fasten a relationship upon a person over whom it has no 
jurisdiction. (See Dodd, Jurisdi~tion in Personal Actions, 23 
Ill.L.Rev. 427, 439.) 
[6] Plaintiff correctly concedes that if the purpose of the 
present action were to enforce a duty of support or some 
other personal obligation growing out of the parent-child 
relationship, personal jurisdiction over defendant would be 
essential. (See Baldwin v. Baldwin. 28 Ca1.2d 406, 415 (170 
P.2d 670]; In re Hindi, 71 Ariz. 17 [222 P.2d 991, 993].) 
[7] This requirement cannot be avoided by limiting the relief 
sought to a binding adjudication of the parties t status, since 
such an adjudication would prevent relitigation of the basic 
issue on which defendant's personal obligations to plaintiff 
must rest and to that extent would necessarily constitute a 
personal judgment against him. (See In re Hindi, supra; 
Rediker v. Rediker, supra.)· [8] Moreover, the fact that it 
-It is unnecessary to determine whether, given personal jurisdiction 
over both of the parties, a judgment establishing the parent·child rela· 
tionship would be in rem so as to be binding on third parties less directly 
eoncemed with the question in issue. (See 2 Armstrong, California 
~ Law 818·919.) 
) 
Dec. 1956] HARTFORD tI. SUPERIOR COURT r,' C.2CS "'J; 3040 P.2d 11 455 
may appear unlikely that plaintiff will ever have occasion 
to assert any personal rights against defendant based on 
the claimed relationship between them cannot justify giving 
any judgment that might be obtained an e1iect to which it 
would otherwise not be entitled. 
Although there is language in Urquhart v. Urquhart, 185 
Misc. 915 [57 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737], and in Fordham v. Marrero. 
273 F. 61, 67, that supports the contention that a child's 
status may be determined without personal jurisdiction over 
his alleged parent, the holding in neither case is inconsistent 
with the conclusion we have reached here. Thus, in the 
Urquhart case the absent parent attacked the court's juris-
diction over the subject matter rather than over his person. 
Moreover, the action was brought against both of the parents 
and one of them was subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 
Accordingly, there was clearly jurisdiction to award part of 
the relief sought and it was appropriate that the absent parent 
be given notice of the action, whether or not he would be 
bound by the adjudication. In the Fordham case the de-
termination of parentage was ancillary to the administration 
of an estate subject to the court's jurisdiction, and the court 
had power to determine the question of heirship without· 
securing personal jurisdiction over all of the parties. (See 
Estate of Wise, 34 Ca1.2d 376. 385 [210 P.2d 497].) 
The question remains whether plaintiff is entitled to main-
tain this action despite the court's lack of power to make a 
binding determination that he is defendant's child without 
personal jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff is primarily 
concerned with establishing his true identity and reducing or 
eliminating the evidentiary effect of his alleged false birth 
certificate (see Vanderln"lt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J.Eq. 910 [67 
A. 97, 99, 14 L.R.A.N.S. 304]) to facilitate his dealings with 
military and other governmental officials. . [9] It has been 
recognized that even when it is not res judicata, a determina-
tion of pedigree may constitute evidence of the facts ad-
judicated (Morecroft v. Taylor, 225 App.Div. 562 [234 N.Y.S. 
2, 6]; see Health & Saf. Code, §§ 10600-10607; I'll, re Lee 
Fang Fook, 74 F.Supp. 68, 71; Casares-Moreno v. United 
States, 226 F.2d 873. 874: Bayse, Determination of Heirship, 
54 Mich.L.Rev. 737, 747-749), and such a determination may 
be sufficient to satisfy governmental authorities that require 
for one purpose or another satisfactory evidence of birth and 
identity. [10] Moreover, the fact that it might be used as 
\ 
} 
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evidence in subsequent litigation would not constitute a denial 
of due process just as the use of any public record based on 
ex parte statements would not.1i [11] Accordingly, it must 
be determined whether section 231 may reasonably be in-
terpreted as authorizing an action to secure a judgment the 
e1iect of which would necessarily be limited to constituting 
evidence of the facts adjudicated. We have concluded that 
it may not. By its express terms it provides for an action 
"between the parties" for the declaration of "the existence 
or nonexistence ... of the relation of parent and child, by 
birth or adoption," and normally the judgment in such an 
action would be res judicata. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1908.) 
[12] In the present case, however, the judgment could not 
have that e1iect in whole or in part in the absence of personal 
jurisdiction over defendant. It could not, as in the case o! 
an ex parte divorce, conclusively adjudicate the future rela-
tionship of the parties to one another (see Rediker v. Rediker, 
supra, 35 Cal.2d 796, 802), and its purpose is not to adjudi-
cate any interest in defendant's property located in this state. 
In the latter situation it has been recognized that a judgment 
obtained without personal jurisdiction is not even evidence 
against the defendant except as it a1iects his interest in the 
property involved (First Nat. Bank v. Eastman, 144 Cal. 
487, 491-492 [77 P. 104~, 103 Am.St.Rep. 95, 1 Ann.Cas. 
626] ; Brown v. Campbell, 100 Cal. 635, 641 [35 P. 433, 38 
Am.St.Rep. 314]), and there is no basis for assuming that in 
making general provisions for various types of actions the 
Legislature intended that final judgments obtained without 
personal jurisdiction should have purely evidentiary e1iect 
in some cases but not in others. There is nothing in the 
language of section 231 that suggests that actions thereunder 
should be treated di1ierently from other actions in this respect, 
and it is significant that in the Health and Safety Code the 
Legislature has made provision for the securing of evidentiary 
records of vital statistics by means of ex parte judicial and 
administrative procedures. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 10575-
10578; 10600-10607; 10615-10618; see also Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2084, subdivision 2 [perpetuation of testimony with respect 
to questions of pedigree].) Whether plainti1i may invoke 
any of these procedures to secure the evidence he desires is 
·Code of Civil Procedure, section 585, subdivision S provides that be-
fore a default judgment mny be entered in a proceeding of tbis sort, the 
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a question not before us in this proceeding. The existence of 
such remedies, however, even though they may not provide 
relief in all circumstances, fortifies the conclusion that section 
231 contemplates only an ordinary civil action. Since under 
the circumstances of this case, personal jurisdiction over 
defendant is essential for such an action, the service uPQn him 
outside the state was ineffective. 
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed for. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
